Global warming: Forecasts by scientists versus scientific forecasts by Green, Kesten C. & Armstrong, J. Scott
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Global warming: Forecasts by scientists
versus scientific forecasts
Kesten C. Green and J. Scott Armstrong
3. August 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4361/
MPRA Paper No. 4361, posted 7. August 2007
Global Warming: Forecasts by Scientists versus Scientific Forecasts* 
 
 
Kesten C. Green, Business and Economic Forecasting Unit, Monash University,  
Victoria 3800, Australia. 
Contact: PO Box 10800, Wellington 6143, New Zealand. 
kesten@kestencgreen.com; T +64 4 976 3245; F +64 4 976 3250 
 
J. Scott Armstrong†, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
747 Huntsman, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. 
armstrong@wharton.upenn.edu  
 
(This paper is a draft of an article that is forthcoming in Energy and Environment.) 
Version 53 – August 3, 2007 
We continue to work on this paper and we invite peer review 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Working Group One, a panel of 
experts established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Programme, issued its Fourth Assessment Report. The Report included predictions 
of dramatic increases in average world temperatures over the next 92 years and serious harm 
resulting from the predicted temperature increases. Using forecasting principles as our guide we 
asked: Are these forecasts a good basis for developing public policy? Our answer is “no.” 
 To provide forecasts of climate change that are useful for policy-making, one would need 
to forecast (1) global temperature, (2) the effects of any temperature changes, (3) the effects of 
alternative policies, and (4) whether the best policy would be successfully implemented. Proper 
forecasts of all four are necessary for rational policy making.  
The IPCC Report was regarded as providing the most credible long-term forecasts of 
global average temperatures by 31 of the 51 scientists and others involved in forecasting climate 
change who responded to our survey. We found no references to the primary sources of 
information on forecasting methods despite the fact these are easily available in books, articles, 
and websites. We audited the forecasting processes described in Chapter 8 of the IPCC’s WG1 
Report to assess the extent to which they complied with forecasting principles. We found enough 
information to make judgments on 89 out of a total of 140 forecasting principles. The forecasting 
procedures that were described violated 72 principles. Many of the violations were, by 
themselves, critical.  
The forecasts in the Report were not the outcome of scientific procedures. In effect, they 
were the opinions of scientists transformed by mathematics and obscured by complex writing. 
Research on forecasting has shown that experts’ predictions are not useful. We have been unable 
to identify any scientific forecasts of global warming. Claims that the Earth will get warmer have 
no more credence than saying that it will get colder.  
 
Keywords: accuracy, audit, climate change, evaluation, expert judgment, mathematical models, 
public policy. 
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“A trend is a trend, 
But the question is, will it bend? 
Will it alter its course  
Through some unforeseen force 
And come to a premature end?” 
Alec Cairncross, 1969 
 
Research on forecasting has been conducted since the 1930s. Empirical studies that compare 
methods in order to determine which ones provide the most accurate forecasts in given situations 
are the most useful source of evidence. Findings, along with the evidence, were first summarized 
in Armstrong (1978, 1985). In the mid-1990s, the forecasting principles project was established 
with the objective of summarizing all useful knowledge about forecasting. The knowledge was 
codified as evidence-based principles, or condition-action statements, in order to provide 
guidance on which methods to use when. The project led to the Principles of Forecasting 
handbook (Armstrong 2001): the work of 40 internationally-known experts on forecasting 
methods and 123 reviewers who were also leading experts on forecasting methods. The 
summarizing process alone required a four-year effort.  
The forecasting principles are easy to find: They are freely available on 
forecastingprinciples.com, a site sponsored by the International Institute of Forecasters.  The 
Forecasting Principles site has been at the top of the list of sites in internet searches for 
“forecasting”, for many years. A summary of the principles, currently numbering 140, is provided 
as a checklist in the Forecasting Audit software available on the site. There is no other source that 
provides evidence-based forecasting principles. The site is often updated as evidence on 
forecasting comes to hand. A recent review of new evidence on some of the key principles was 
published in Armstrong (2006). 
The strength of evidence is different for different principles, for example some principles are 
based on common sense or received wisdom. Such principles are included when there is no 
contrary evidence. Other principles have some empirical support, while 31 are strongly supported 
by empirical evidence. 
Many of the principles go beyond common sense, and some are counter-intuitive. As a result, 
those who forecast in ignorance of the forecasting research literature are unlikely to produce 
useful predictions. For example, here are some well-established principles that apply to long-term 
forecasts for situations involving of complex issues where the causal factors are subject to 
uncertainty (as with climate): 
 
• Unaided judgmental forecasts by experts have no value. This applies whether the 
opinions are expressed in words, spreadsheets, or mathematical models. It also 
applies regardless of how much scientific evidence is possessed by the experts. 
Among the reasons for this are: 
a) Complexity:  People cannot assess complex relationships through 
unaided observations. 
b) Coincidence:  People confuse correlation with causation. 
c) Feedback:  People making judgmental predictions typically do not 
receive unambiguous feedback they can use to improve 
their forecasting.  
d) Bias:  People have difficulty in obtaining or using evidence that 
contradicts their initial beliefs. This problem is especially 
serious for people who view themselves as experts. 
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• Agreement among experts is weakly related to accuracy. This is especially true 
when the experts communicate with one another and when they work together to 
solve problems, as is the case with the IPCC process.  
• Complex models (those involving nonlinearities and interactions) harm accuracy 
because their errors multiply. Ascher (1978), refers to the Club of Rome’s 1972 
forecasts where, unaware of the research on forecasting, the developers proudly 
proclaimed, “in our model about 100,000 relationships are stored in the computer. 
Complex models also tend to fit random variations in historical data well, with the 
consequence that they forecast poorly and provide misleading conclusions about the 
uncertainty of the outcome. Finally, when complex models are developed there are 
many opportunities for errors and the complexity means the errors are difficult to 
find. Craig, Gadgil, and Koomey (2002) came to similar conclusions in their review 
of long-term energy forecasts for the US made between 1950 and 1980.  
• Given even modest uncertainty, prediction intervals are enormous. For example, 
prediction intervals (ranges outside which outcomes are unlikely to fall) expand 
rapidly as time horizons increase, so that one is faced with enormous intervals even 
when trying to forecast a straightforward thing such as automobile sales for General 
Motors over the next five years.  
• When there is uncertainty in forecasting, forecasts should be conservative. 
Uncertainty arises when data contain measurement errors, when the series are 
unstable, when knowledge about the direction of relationships is uncertain, and 
when a forecast depends upon forecasts of related (causal) variables. For example, 
forecasts of no change were found to be more accurate than trend forecasts for 
annual sales when there was substantial uncertainty in the trend lines (e.g., Schnaars 
and Bavuso 1986). This principle also implies that forecasts should revert to long-
term trends when such trends have been firmly established, do not waver, and there 
are no firm reasons to suggest that they will change. Finally, trends should be 
damped toward no-change as the forecast horizon increases.  
 
 
 
The Forecasting Problem 
 
In determining the best policies to deal with the climate of the future, a policy maker first has to 
select an appropriate statistic to use to represent the changing climate. By convention, the statistic 
is the averaged global temperature as measured with thermometers at ground stations throughout 
the world, though in practice this is a far from satisfactory metric (see, e.g., Essex et al., 2007).  
It is then necessary to obtain forecasts and prediction intervals for each of the following: 
 
1. Mean global temperature in the long-term (say 20 years or longer). 
2. Effects of temperature changes on humans and other living things.  
If accurate forecasts of mean global temperature can be obtained and the changes are 
substantial, then it would be necessary to forecast the effects of the changes on the 
health of living things and on the health and wealth of humans. The concerns about 
changes in global mean temperature are based on the assumption that the earth is 
currently at the optimal temperature and that variations over years (unlike variations 
within days and years) are undesirable. For a proper assessment, costs and benefits 
must be comprehensive. (For example, policy responses to Rachel Carson’s Silent 
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Spring should have been based in part on forecasts of the number of people who 
might die from malaria if DDT use were reduced). 
3. Costs and benefits of alternative policy proposals.  
If reliable forecasts of the effects of the temperature changes on the health of living 
things and on the health and wealth of humans can be obtained and the forecasts are 
for substantial harmful effects, then it would be necessary to forecast the costs and 
benefits of alternative policy proposals.  
4. Whether the policy changes can be implemented successfully. 
If reliable forecasts of the costs and benefits of alternative policy proposals can be 
obtained and at least one proposal is predicted to lead to net benefits, then it would be 
necessary to forecast whether the policy changes can be implemented successfully.  
 
A policy proposal should only be implemented if reliable forecasts of policy implementation can 
be obtained and the forecasts show net benefits from the policy, and the policy can be 
successfully implemented. A failure to obtain scientifically validated forecasts at any stage would 
render subsequent stages irrelevant. Thus, we focus on the first of the four forecasting problems.  
Is it necessary to use scientific forecasting methods? In other words, to use methods that have 
been shown by empirical validation to be relevant to the types of problems involved with climate 
forecasting? Or is it sufficient to have leading scientists examine the evidence and make 
forecasts? We address this issue before moving on to our audits. 
 
 
On the value of forecasts by experts 
 
Many public policy decisions are based on forecasts by experts. Research on persuasion has 
shown that people have substantial faith in the value of such forecasts. Faith increases when 
experts agree with one another. 
Our concern is with what we refer to as unaided expert judgments. In such cases, experts may 
have access to empirical studies and other information, but they use their knowledge to make 
predictions without the aid of well-established forecasting principles. Thus, they could simply use 
the information to come up with judgmental forecasts. Alternatively, they could translate their 
beliefs into mathematical statements (or models) and use those to make forecasts.   
Although they may seem convincing at the time, expert forecasts make for humorous reading 
in retrospect. Cerf and Navasky’s (1998) book contains 310 pages of examples, such as Fermi 
Award-winning scientist John von Neumann’s 1956 prediction that “A few decades hence, 
energy may be free”. Examples of expert climate forecasts that turned out to be completely wrong 
are easy to find, such as UC Davis ecologist Kenneth Watt’s prediction in a speech at 
Swarthmore College on Earth Day, April 22, 1970:  
If present trends continue, the world will be about four degrees colder in 1990, 
but eleven degrees colder in the year 2000. This is about twice what it would take 
to put us into an ice age.  
Are such examples merely a matter of selective perception? The second author’s review of 
empirical research on this problem led him to develop the “Seer-sucker theory,” which can be 
stated as “No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not exist, seers will find suckers” 
(Armstrong 1980). The amount of expertise does not matter beyond a basic minimum level. There 
are exceptions to the Seer-sucker Theory: When experts get substantial well-summarized 
feedback about the accuracy of their forecasts and about the reasons why their forecasts were or 
were not accurate, they can improve their forecasting. This situation applies for short-term (up to 
five day) weather forecasts, but we are not aware of any such regime for long-term global climate 
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forecasting. Even if there were such a regime, the feedback would trickle in over many years 
before it became useful for improving forecasting. 
Research since 1980 has added support to the Seer-sucker Theory. In particular, Tetlock 
(2005) recruited 284 people whose professions included, “commenting or offering advice on 
political and economic trends.”  He asked them to forecast the probability that various situations 
would or would not occur, picking areas (geographic and substantive) within and outside their 
areas of expertise. By 2003, he had accumulated over 82,000 forecasts. The experts barely if at all 
outperformed non-experts and neither group did well against simple rules. 
Comparative empirical studies have routinely concluded that judgmental forecasting by 
experts is the least accurate of the methods available to make forecasts. For example, Ascher 
(1978, p. 200), in his analysis of long-term forecasts of electricity consumption found that was the 
case. 
Experts’ forecasts of climate changes have long been popular. Anderson and Gainor (2006) 
found the following headlines in their search of the New York Times: 
Sept. 18, 1924 “MacMillan Reports Signs of New Ice Age” 
March 27, 1933 “America in Longest Warm Spell Since 1776” 
May 21, 1974 “Scientists Ponder Why World’s Climate is Changing:  
A Major Cooling Widely Considered to be Inevitable” 
Dec. 27, 2005 “Past Hot Times Hold Few Reasons to Relax About New 
Warming” 
 
In each case, the forecasts were made with a high degree of confidence.  
In the mid-1970s, there was a political debate raging about whether the global climate was 
changing. The United States’ National Defense University (NDU) addressed this issue in their 
book, Climate Change to the Year 2000 (NDU 1978). This study involved nine man-years of 
effort by Department of Defense and other agencies, aided by experts who received honoraria, 
and a contract of nearly $400,000 (in 2007 dollars). The heart of the study was a survey of 
experts. It provided them with a chart of “annual mean temperature, 0-800 N. latitude,” that 
showed temperature rising from 1870 to early 1940 then dropping sharply up to 1970. The 
conclusion, based primarily on 19 replies weighted by the study directors, was that while a slight 
increase in temperature might occur, uncertainty was so high that “the next twenty years will be 
similar to that of the past” and the effects of any change would be negligible. Clearly, this was a 
forecast by scientists, not a scientific forecast. However, it proved to be quite influential. The 
report was discussed in The Global 2000 Report to the President (Carter) and at the World 
Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979.  
The methodology for climate forecasting used in the past few decades has shifted from 
surveys of experts’ opinions to the use of computer models. However, based on the explanations 
that we have seen, such models are, in effect, mathematical ways for the experts to express their 
opinions. To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that presenting opinions in 
mathematical terms rather than in words will contribute to forecast accuracy. For example, 
Keepin and Wynne (1984) wrote in the summary of their study of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis’s “widely acclaimed” projections for global energy that, “Despite the 
appearance of analytical rigour… [they] are highly unstable and based on informal guesswork”. 
Things have changed little since the days of Malthus in the 1800s. Malthus forecast mass 
starvation. He expressed his opinions mathematically. His mathematical model predicted that the 
supply of food would increase arithmetically while the human population grew at a geometric rate 
and went hungry.  
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International surveys of climate scientists from 27 countries, obtained by Brat and von Storch 
in 1996 and 2003, were summarized by Bast and Taylor (2007). Many scientists were skeptical 
about the predictive validity of climate models. Of more than 1,060 respondents, 35% agreed 
with the statement, “Climate models can accurately predict future climates,” and 47% percent 
disagreed. Members of the general public were also divided. An Ipsos Mori poll of 2,031 people 
aged 16 and over found that 40% agreed that “climate change was too complex and uncertain for 
scientists to make useful forecasts” while 38% disagreed (Eccleston 2007). 
Trenberth (2007) has claimed that the IPCC does not provide forecasts but rather presents 
scenarios or “projections.” As best as we can tell, these terms are used by the IPCC authors to 
indicate that they provide “conditional forecasts.” As it happens, the word “forecast” and its 
derivatives occurred 37 times, and “predict” and its derivatives occurred 90 times in the body of 
Chapter 8. Recall also that most of our respondents (29 of whom were IPCC authors or 
reviewers) nominated the IPCC report as the most credible source of forecasts (not “scenarios” or 
“projections”) of global average temperature. We conclude that the IPCC does provide forecasts 
and that these forecasts are informed by the modelers’ experience and by their models—but they 
are unaided by the application of forecasting principles.   
 
 
An examination of climate forecasting methods 
 
We searched for prior reviews of long-term climate forecasting processes and found nine 
independent reviews. We also assessed the extent to which those who have made climate 
forecasts used evidence-based forecasting procedures. We did this by conducting Google 
searches. We then conducted a “forecasting audit” of the forecasting process behind the IPCC 
forecasts. The key aspects of a forecasting audit that can be used to identify ways to improve the 
audited forecasting process are to:  
•  examine all elements of the forecasting process, 
•  use principles that are supported by evidence, or are self-evidently true and 
unchallenged by evidence, against which to judge the forecasting process, 
•  rate the forecasting process against each principle, preferably using more than one 
independent rater, 
•  disclose the audit. 
  
To our knowledge, no one has ever published a paper that is based on a forecasting audit, as 
defined here. We suggest that for forecasts involving important public policies, such audits 
should be expected and perhaps even required. In addition, they should be fully disclosed with 
respect to who did the audit, what biases might be involved, and what were the detailed findings 
from the audit. 
 
 
Reviews of climate forecasts 
 
We could not find any comprehensive reviews of climate forecasting efforts. With the exception 
of Stewart and Glantz (1985), the reviews did not refer to evidence-based findings. None of the 
reviews provided explicit ratings of the processes and, again with the exception of Stewart and 
Glantz, little attention was given to full disclosure of the reviewing process. Finally, some 
reviews ignored the forecasting methods and focused on the accuracy of the forecasts. 
Stewart and Glantz (1985) conducted an audit of the National Defense University (NDU 
1978) forecasting process that we described above. They were critical of the report because it 
lacked an awareness of proper forecasting methodology. Their audit was hampered because the 
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organizers of the study said that the raw data had been destroyed and a request to the Institute for 
the Future about the sensitivity of the forecasts to the weights went unanswered. Judging from a 
Google Scholar search, climate forecasters have paid little attention to this paper.  
Carter, et al. (2006) examined the Stern Review (Stern 2007). They concluded that the authors 
of the Report made predictions without reference to scientific validation and without proper peer 
review.  
Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis (2007) concluded that the long-term climate forecasts they examined 
were based only on the opinions of the scientists. The scientists’ opinions were expressed in 
complex mathematical terms without any evidence on the validity of chosen approach. The 
authors provided the following quotation on their page 45 to summarize their assessment: 
“Today’s scientists have substituted mathematics for experiments, and they wander off through 
equation after equation and eventually build a structure which has no relation to reality (Nikola 
Telsa, inventor and electrical engineer, 1934).” While it is sensible to be explicit about beliefs and 
to formulate these in a model, forecasters must also demonstrate that the relationships are valid. 
Carter (2007) examined evidence on the predictive validity of the general circulation models 
(GCMs) used by the IPCC scientists.  He found that while the models included some basic 
principles of physics, scientists had to make “educated guesses” about the values of many 
parameters because knowledge about the physical processes of the earth’s climate is incomplete. 
In practice, the GCMs failed to predict recent global average temperatures as accurately as simple 
curve-fitting approaches (Carter 2007, pp. 64 – 65). They also forecast greater warming at higher 
altitudes in the tropics when the opposite has been the case (p. 64). Further, individual GCMs 
produce widely different forecasts from the same initial conditions and minor changes in 
parameters can result in forecasts of global cooling (Essex and McKitrick, 2002). Interestingly, 
when models predict global cooling, the forecasts are often rejected as “outliers” or “obviously 
wrong” (e.g., Stainforth et al., 2005). 
Roger Pielke Sr. gave an assessment of climate models in a 2007 interview (available at 
http://climatesci.colorado.edu/2007/04/30/interview-by-marcel-crok-of-roger-a-pielke-sr-jan-
2007/):  
You can always reconstruct after the fact what happened if you run enough 
model simulations. The challenge is to run it on an independent dataset, say for 
the next five years. But then they will say “the model is not good for five years 
because there is too much noise in the system”. That’s avoiding the issue then. 
They say you have to wait 50 years, but then you can’t validate the model, so 
what good is it? 
…Weather is very difficult to predict; climate involves weather plus all these 
other components of the climate system, ice, oceans, vegetation, soil etc. Why 
should we think we can do better with climate prediction than with weather 
prediction? To me it’s obvious, we can’t!  
I often hear scientists say “weather is unpredictable, but climate you can 
predict because it is the average weather”. How can they prove such a statement?  
 
Bellamy and Barrett (2007) found serious deficiencies in the general circulation models described 
in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report. In particular, the models (1) produced very different 
distributions of clouds and none was close the actual distribution of clouds, (2) parameters for 
incoming radiation absorbed by the atmosphere and for that absorbed by the Earth’s surface 
varied considerably, (3) did not accurately represent what is known about the effects of CO2 and 
could not represent the possible positive and negative feedbacks about which there is great 
uncertainty. The authors concluded: 
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The climate system is a highly complex system and, to date, no computer models 
are sufficiently accurate for their predictions of future climate to be relied upon. 
(p. 72)   
Trenberth (2007), a lead author of Chapter 3 in the IPCC WG1 report wrote in a Nature.com blog 
“… the science is not done because we do not have reliable or regional predictions of climate.” 
Taylor (2007) compared seasonal forecasts by New Zealand’s National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research (NIWA) with outcomes for the period May 2002 to April 2007. He found 
NIWA’s forecasts of average regional temperatures for the season ahead were, at 48% correct., 
which was no more accurate than chance. That this is a general result was confirmed by New 
Zealand climatologist Dr Jim Renwick, who observed that NIWA’s low success rate was 
comparable to that of other forecasting groups worldwide. He added that “Climate prediction is 
hard, half of the variability in the climate system is not predictable, and so we don't expect to do 
terrifically well.” Dr Renwick is an author on Working Group I of the IPCC 4th Assessment 
Report, and also serves on the World Meteorological Organization Commission for Climatology 
Expert Team on Seasonal Forecasting. His expert view is that current GCM climate models are 
unable to predict future climate any better than chance (New Zealand Climate Science Coalition 
2007). 
Similarly, Vizard, Anderson, and Buckley (2005) found seasonal rainfall forecasts for 
Australian townships were insufficiently accurate to be useful to intended consumers such as 
farmers planning for feed requirements. The forecasts were released only 15 days ahead of each 
three month period. 
 
 
A survey to identify the most credible long-term forecasts of global temperature 
 
We surveyed scientists involved in long-term climate forecasting and policy makers. Our primary 
concern was to identify the most important forecasts and how those forecasts were made. In 
particular, we wished to know if the most widely accepted forecasts of global average 
temperature were based on the opinions of experts or on scientific forecasting methods. Given the 
findings of our review of reviews of climate forecasting, conclusion from our Google search that 
many scientists are unaware of evidence-based findings related to forecasting methods, we 
expected that the forecasts would be based on the opinions of scientists. 
We sent a questionnaire to experts who had expressed diverse opinions on global warming. 
We generated lists of experts by identifying key people and asking them to identify others. (The 
lists are provided in Appendix A.) Most (70%) of the 240 experts on our lists were IPCC 
reviewers and authors. 
The questionnaire asked the experts to provide references for what they regarded as the most 
credible source of long-term forecasts of mean global temperatures. We strove for simplicity to 
minimize resistance to our request. Even busy people should have time to send a few references, 
especially if they believe that it is important to evaluate the quality of the forecasts that will 
influence major decisions. We asked: 
“We want to know which forecasts people regard as the most credible and 
how those forecasts were derived…  
    In your opinion, which scientific article is the source of the 
most credible forecasts of global average temperatures over 
the rest of this century?” 
We received useful responses from 51 people, 42 of whom provided references to what they 
regarded as credible sources of long-term forecasts of mean global temperatures. Interestingly, 
eight respondents provided references in support of their claims that no credible forecasts exist. 
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Of the 42 expert respondents who were associated with global warming views, 30 referred us to 
the IPCC’s report. 
Based on the replies to this survey, it was clear that the IPCC’s Working Group 1 Report 
contained the forecasts that are viewed as most credible by the bulk climate community. These 
forecasts are contained in Chapter 10 of the  Report and the models that are used to forecast 
climate are assessed in Chapter 8, “Climate Models and Their Evaluation” (Randall et al. 2007). 
Chapter 8 provided the most useful information on the forecasting process used by the IPCC to 
derive forecasts of mean global temperatures, so we audited that chapter. 
We also posted calls on email lists and on the forecastingprinciples.com site asking for help 
from those who might have any knowledge about scientific climate forecasts. This yielded few 
responses, only one of which provided relevant references.  
 
A forecasting audit for global warming 
 
In order to audit the forecasting processes described in Chapter 8 of the IPCC’s report, we each 
read it prior to any discussion. Chapter 8 was, in our judgment, poorly written. The writing 
showed little concern for the target readership. It provided extensive detail on items that are of 
little interest in judging the merits of the forecasting process, provided references without 
describing what readers might find, and imposed an incredible burden on readers by providing 
788 references. We found the Chapter difficult to read. In addition, the Chapter reads in places 
like a sales brochure. In the three-page executive summary, the terms, “new” and “improved” and 
related derivatives appeared 17 times. Most significantly, the chapter omitted key details on the 
assumptions and the forecasting process that were used. If the authors used a formal structured 
procedure to assess the forecasting processes, this was not evident. 
We each made a formal, independent audit of IPCC Chapter 8 in May 2007. To do so, we 
used the Forecasting Audit software on the forecastingprinciples.com site, which is based on 
material originally published in Armstrong (2001). To our knowledge, it is the only evidence-
based tool for evaluating forecasting procedures.  
While Chapter 8 required many hours to read, it took us each about one hour to rate the 
forecasting approach described in the Chapter using the Audit software. We have each been 
involved with developing the Forecasting Audit program, so other users would likely require 
much more time. Ratings are on a 5-point scale from -2 to +2. A rating of +2 indicates the 
forecasting procedures were consistent with a principle, and a rating of -2 indicates failure to 
comply with a principle. The Audit software also has options to indicate that there is insufficient 
information to rate the procedures or that the principle is not relevant to a particular forecasting 
problem. 
 Our initial overall average ratings were similar at -1.37 and -1.35. We compared our 
individual ratings for individual principles and discussed inconsistencies. In some cases we 
averaged the ratings, truncating toward zero. In other cases we decided that there was insufficient 
information or that the information was too ambiguous to rate with confidence. Our final ratings 
are fully disclosed in the Special Interest Group section of the forecastingprinciples.com site that 
is devoted to Public Policy (publicpolicyforecasting.com).  
Of the 140 principles in the Forecasting Audit, we judged that 127 were relevant for auditing 
the forecasting problem addressed in Chapter 8. The Chapter provided insufficient information to 
rate the forecasting procedures that were used against 38 of these principles. For example, we did 
not rate the Chapter against Principle 10.2, “Use all important variables.” At least in part, our 
difficulty in auditing the Chapter was due to the fact that it was abstruse. It was sometimes 
difficult to know whether the information we sought was present or not.  
Of the 89 forecasting principles that we were able to rate, the Chapter violated 72. Adherence 
to some of the key principles is necessary for forecasts to be valid. We address four such 
principles, all based on strong empirical evidence: violation of any one of them would render the 
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IPCC climate forecasts invalid. All four of these key principles were violated by the forecasting 
procedures described in IPCC Chapter 8. We key these principles to their numbering in the 
Forecasting Audit software. 
 
Consider whether the events or series can be forecasted (Principle 1.4) 
 
This principle refers to whether a forecasting method can be used that would do better than a 
naïve method. A common naïve method is to assume that things will not change.  
Interestingly, naïve methods are often strong competitors with more sophisticated 
alternatives. This is especially so when there is much uncertainty. To the extent that uncertainty is 
high, forecasters should emphasize the naïve method. (This is illustrated by regression model 
coefficients: when uncertainty increases, the coefficients tend towards zero.) Departures from the 
naïve model tend to increase forecast error when uncertainty is high. 
In our judgment, the uncertainty in forecasting global mean temperature is extremely high. 
For example, there is controversy among climate scientists over the current trend. One researcher, 
Carter (2007, p. 67) wrote: 
…the slope and magnitude of temperature trends inferred from 
time-series data depend upon the choice of data end points. 
Drawing trend lines through highly variable, cyclic temperature 
data or proxy data is therefore a dubious exercise. Accurate direct 
measurements of tropospheric global average temperature have 
only been available since 1979, and they show no evidence for 
greenhouse warming. Surface thermometer data, though flawed, 
also show temperature stasis since 1998.  
Global climate is complex. Scientific evidence on many key relationships is weak or absent; e.g., 
does increased CO2 in the atmosphere cause high temperatures or do high temperatures increase 
CO2 (e.g. Jaworowski 2007)? Measurements of key variables such as local temperatures and a 
representative global temperature are contentious in the case of modern measurements, because 
of the distribution of weather stations and possible artifacts such as the urban heat island effect, 
and often speculative in the case of ancient ones, such as those climate proxies derived from tree 
ring and ice-core data (Carter 2007). Finally, it is difficult to forecast the causal variables. Stott 
and Kettleborough (2002, p. 723) summarize: 
Even with perfect knowledge of emissions, uncertainties in the 
representation of atmospheric and oceanic processes by climate 
models limit the accuracy of any estimate of the climate 
response. Natural variability, generated both internally and from 
external forcings such as changes in solar output and explosive 
volcanic eruptions, also contributes to the uncertainty in climate 
forecasts. 
The already high level of uncertainty rises rapidly as the forecast horizon increases. 
While the authors of Chapter 8 claim that the forecasts of global mean temperature are well-
founded, their language is imprecise and relies heavily on such words as “generally,” “reasonable 
well,” “widely,” and “relatively” [to what?]. The report makes many explicit references to 
uncertainty. For example, the phrases “. . . it is not yet possible to determine which estimates of 
the climate change cloud feedbacks are the most reliable” and “Despite advances since the TAR, 
substantial uncertainty remains in the magnitude of cryospheric feedbacks within AOGCMs” 
appear on p. 593. In discussing the modeling of temperature, the authors wrote, “The extent to 
which these systematic model errors affect a model’s response to external perturbations is 
unknown, but may be significant” (p. 608), and, “The diurnal temperature range… is generally 
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too small in the models, in many regions by as much as 50%” (p. 609), and “It is not yet known 
why models generally underestimate the diurnal temperature range.” The following words and 
phrases appear at least once in the Chapter: unknown, uncertain, unclear, not clear, disagreement, 
uncertain, not fully understood, appears, not well observed, variability, variety, difference, 
unresolved, not resolved, and poorly understood. 
Given the high uncertainty regarding climate, the appropriate naïve method for this situation 
would be the “no-change” model. Prior evidence on forecasting methods suggests that attempts to 
improve upon the naïve model might increase forecast error. To reverse this conclusion, one 
would have to produce validated evidence in favor of alternative methods. Such evidence is not 
provided in Chapter 8 of the IPCC report. 
We are not suggesting that climate change cannot be forecast, only that this has yet to be 
demonstrated. Methods such as the naïve model with drift, rule-based forecasting, well-specified 
simple causal models, and combined forecasts might prove useful. The methods are discussed in 
Armstrong (2001). To our knowledge, their application to long-term climate forecasting has not 
been examined to date. 
 
Keep forecasting methods simple (Principle 7.1) 
 
Complex methods involve the use of a large number of variables in forecasting models, 
complex interactions, and relationships that employ nonlinear parameters. Complex forecasting 
methods are only accurate when there is little uncertainty about the relationships now and in the 
future, where the data are subject to little error, and where the causal variables can be accurately 
forecasted. These conditions do not apply to climate forecasting. Thus, simple methods are 
recommended. We gained the impression from the IPPC chapters and from related papers that 
climate forecasters generally believe that complex models are necessary for forecasting climate 
and that forecast accuracy will increase with model complexity.  
The use of complex models when uncertainty is high is at odds with the evidence from 
forecasting research (e.g., Allen and Fildes 2001, Armstrong 1985, Duncan, Gorr and Szczypula 
2001, Wittink and Bergestuen 2001). The use of complex methods makes criticism difficult and 
prevents forecast users from understanding how forecasts were derived. One effect of this 
exclusion of others from the forecasting process is to reduce the chances of detecting errors.    
 
Do not use fit to develop the model (Principle 9.3) 
 
It was not clear to us to what extent the models described in Chapter 8 (or in Chapter 9 by Hegerl 
et al. 2007) are either based on, or have been tested against, sound empirical data. However, some 
statements were made about the ability of the models to fit historical data, after tweaking their 
parameters. Extensive research has shown that the ability of models to fit historical data has little 
relationship to forecast accuracy (See “Evaluating forecasting methods” in Armstrong 2001.) It is 
well known that fit can be improved by making a model more complex. The typical consequence 
of increasing complexity to improve fit, however, is to decrease the accuracy of forecasts.  
 
Use out-of-sample (ex ante) error measures (Principle 13.26) 
 
Chapter 8 did not provide evidence on the accuracy of ex ante long-term forecasts from the 
models used to generate the IPCC’s forecasts of climate change. It would have been feasible to 
assess the accuracy of alternative forecasting methods for short- and medium-term forecasts by 
using “successive updating.” This involves withholding data on a number of years, then providing 
forecasts for one-year ahead, then two-years ahead, and so on up to, say, 20 years. The actual 
years could be disguised during these validation procedures. Furthermore, the years could be 
reversed (without telling the forecasters) to assess back-casting accuracy. If, as is suggested by 
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forecasting principles, the models were unable to improve on the accuracy of forecasts from the 
naïve method in such tests, there would be no reason to suppose that accuracy would improve for 
longer forecasts. “Evaluating forecasting methods” in Armstrong 2001 provides evidence on this 
principle.  
 
 
Summary of audit findings 
  
A list of the 72 violations of forecasting principles by the IPCC forecasting procedures is 
provided on the Public Policy Special Interest Group Page at forecastingprinciples.com. The 
many violations provide further evidence that the IPCC authors were unaware of evidence-based 
principles for forecasting. If they were aware of them, it would have been incumbent on them to 
present evidence to justify their departures from the principles. They did not do so.  We conclude 
that because the forecasting processes examined in Chapter 8 overlook scientific evidence on 
forecasting, the IPCC forecasts of climate change are not scientific. 
We invite others to provide evidence-based audits of Chapter 8. These can be posted on web 
sites to ensure that readers have access to the audits. As with peer review, we will require all 
relevant information on the people who conduct the audits prior to posting the audits. Prior to the 
publication of this paper, we invited other researchers, using messages to email lists and web 
sites, to replicate our audit by providing their own ratings. In addition, we asked for information 
about any relevant principles that have not been included in the Forecasting Audit. At the time of 
writing, we have received neither alternative ratings nor evidence for additional relevant 
principles. 
Climate change forecasters and their clients should use the Forecasting Audit early and often. 
Doing so would help to ensure that they are using appropriate forecasting procedures. Outside 
evaluators should also be encouraged to conduct audits. The audit reports should be made 
available to both the sponsors of the study and the public by posting on an open web site such as 
publicpolicyforecasting.com. 
 
 
Climate forecasters’ use of the scientific literature on forecasting methods 
 
Between April and July 2007, we tried to assess the extent to which climate modelers relied on 
scientific studies on the proper use of forecasting methods. In one approach, we used the 
Advanced Search function of Google Scholar to get a general sense of the extent to which climate 
forecasters refer to scientific studies on forecasting. When we searched for “global warming” and 
“forecasting principles,” we found no relevant sites. Nor did we find any relevant sites for 
“forecastingprinciples.com” and “global warming.” Nor were there any relevant citations for the 
relevant-sounding paper, “Forecasting for Environmental Decision-Making” (Armstrong 1999) 
published in a book with a relevant title: Tools to Aid Environmental Decision Making. A search 
for “global warming” and the best selling textbook on forecasting methods (Makridakis et al. 
1998) revealed two citations, neither related to the prediction of global mean temperatures. 
Finally, there were no citations of the meta-analysis of research on econometric models by Allen 
and Fildes (2001). 
Using the titles of the papers, we independently examined the references in Chapter 8. The 
Chapter contained 788 references. Of these, none had any apparent relationship to forecasting 
methodology. Our examination was not difficult as most papers had titles such as, “Using stable 
water isotopes to evaluate basin-scale simulations of surface water budgets,” and, “Oceanic 
isopycnal mixing by coordinate rotation.”  
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We also examined the 535 references in Chapter 9. Of these, 17 had titles that suggested the 
article might be concerned at least in part with forecasting methods. When we inspected the 17 
articles, we found that none of them referred to the scientific literature on forecasting methods. 
It is difficult to understand how scientific forecasting could be conducted without reference to 
the research literature on how to make forecasts. One would expect to see empirical justification 
for the forecasting methods that were used.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
To provide forecasts of climate change that are useful for policy-making, one would need to 
prepare forecasts of (1) temperature changes, (2) the effects of any temperature changes, (3) the 
effects of proposed policy changes, and (4) whether the best policies would be successfully 
implemented. To justify policy changes based on climate change, policy makers need scientific 
forecasts for all four forecasting problems and they need those forecasts to show net benefits 
flowing from proposed policies. If governments implement policy changes without such 
justification, they are likely to cause harm to many people.  
We have shown that failure occurs with the first forecasting problem: predicting temperature 
over the long term. Specifically, we have been unable to find a scientific forecast to support the 
currently widespread belief in “global warming.” Climate is complex and there is much 
uncertainty about causal relationships and data. Prior research on forecasting suggests that in such 
situations a naïve (no change) forecast would be superior to current predictions. Note that 
recommending the naïve forecast does not mean that we believe that climate will not change; it 
means that we are not convinced that current knowledge about climate is sufficient to make 
useful long-term forecasts about climate. Policy proposals should be assessed on that basis. 
Many policies have been proposed in association with claims of global warming. It is not our 
purpose in this paper to comment on specific policy proposals, but it should be noted that policies 
may be valid regardless of future climate. To assess this, it would be necessary to directly forecast 
costs and benefits assuming that climate does not change or, even better, to forecasts costs and 
benefits under a range of possible future climates. 
Based on our literature searches, those forecasting long-term climate change have no apparent 
knowledge of evidence-based forecasting methods, so we expect that similar conclusions would 
apply to the other three necessary parts of the forecasting problem. 
Public policy makers owe it to the people who would be affected by their policies to base 
them on scientific forecasts. Advocates of policy changes have a similar obligation. We hope that 
in future climate scientists with diverse views will embrace forecasting principles in order to 
provide policy makers with scientific forecasts of climate. 
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Appendix A: People to whom we sent our questionnaire (* indicates a relevant response) 
 
IPCC Working Group 1 
Myles Allen, Richard Alley, Ian Allison, Peter Ambenje, Vincenzo Artale, Paulo Artaxo, 
Alphonsus Baede, Roger Barry, Terje Berntsen, Richard A. Betts, Nathaniel L. Bindoff, Roxana 
Bojariu, Sandrine Bony, Kansri Boonpragob, Pascale Braconnot, Guy Brasseur, Keith Briffa, 
Aristita Busuioc, Jorge Carrasco, Anny Cazenave, Anthony Chen*, Amnat Chidthaisong, Jens 
Hesselbjerg Christensen, Philippe Ciais*, William Collins, Robert Colman*, Peter Cox, Ulrich 
Cubasch, Pedro Leite Da Silva Dias, Kenneth L. Denman, Robert Dickinson, Yihui Ding, Jean-
Claude Duplessy, David Easterling, David W. Fahey, Thierry Fichefet*, Gregory Flato, Piers M. 
de F. Forster*, Pierre Friedlingstein, Congbin Fu, Yoshiyuki Fuji, John Fyfe, Xuejie Gao, 
Amadou Thierno Gaye*, Nathan Gillett*, Filippo Giorgi, Jonathan Gregory*, David Griggs, 
Sergey Gulev, Kimio Hanawa, Didier Hauglustaine, James Haywood, Gabriele Hegerl*, Martin 
Heimann*, Christoph Heinze, Isaac Held*, Bruce Hewitson, Elisabeth Holland, Brian Hoskins, 
Daniel Jacob, Bubu Pateh Jallow, Eystein Jansen*, Philip Jones, Richard Jones, Fortunat Joos, 
Jean Jouzel, Tom Karl, David Karoly*, Georg Kaser, Vladimir Kattsov, Akio Kitoh, Albert Klein 
Tank, Reto Knutti, Toshio Koike, Rupa Kumar Kolli, Won-Tae Kwon, Laurent Labeyrie, René 
Laprise, Corrine Le Quéré, Hervé Le Treut, Judith Lean, Peter Lemke, Sydney Levitus, Ulrike 
Lohmann, David C. Lowe, Yong Luo, Victor Magaña Rueda, Elisa Manzini, Jose Antonio 
Marengo, Maria Martelo, Valérie Masson-Delmotte, Taroh Matsuno, Cecilie Mauritzen, Bryant 
Mcavaney, Linda Mearns, Gerald Meehl, Claudio Guillermo Menendez, John Mitchell, Abdalah 
Mokssit, Mario Molina, Philip Mote*, James Murphy, Gunnar Myhre, Teruyuki Nakajima, John 
Nganga, Neville Nicholls, Akira Noda, Yukihiro Nojiri, Laban Ogallo, Daniel Olago, Bette Otto-
Bliesner, Jonathan Overpeck*, Govind Ballabh Pant, David Parker, Wm. Richard Peltier, Joyce 
Penner*, Thomas Peterson*, Andrew Pitman, Serge Planton, Michael Prather*, Ronald Prinn, 
Graciela Raga, Fatemeh Rahimzadeh, Stefan Rahmstorf, Jouni Räisänen, Srikanthan (S.) 
Ramachandran, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Venkatachalam Ramaswamy, Rengaswamy Ramesh, 
David Randall*, Sarah Raper, Dominique Raynaud, Jiawen Ren, James A. Renwick, David Rind, 
Annette Rinke, Matilde M. Rusticucci, Abdoulaye Sarr, Michael Schulz*, Jagadish Shukla, C. K. 
Shum, Robert H. Socolow*, Brian Soden, Olga Solomina*, Richard Somerville*, Jayaraman 
Srinivasan, Thomas Stocker, Peter A. Stott*, Ron Stouffer, Akimasa Sumi, Lynne D. Talley, Karl 
E. Taylor*, Kevin Trenberth*, Alakkat S. Unnikrishnan, Rob Van Dorland, Ricardo Villalba, Ian 
G. Watterson*, Andrew Weaver*, Penny Whetton, Jurgen Willebrand, Steven C. Wofsy, Richard 
A. Wood, David Wratt, Panmao Zhai, Tingjun Zhang, De'er Zhang, Xiaoye Zhang, Zong-Ci 
Zhao, Francis Zwiers* 
 
Union of Concerned Scientists 
Brenda Ekwurzel, Peter Frumhoff, Amy Lynd Luers 
 
Channel 4 “The Great Global Warming Swindle” documentary (2007) 
Bert Bolin, Piers Corbyn*, Eigil Friis-Christensen, James Shitwaki, Frederick Singer, Carl 
Wunsch* 
 
Wikipedia’s list of global warming “skeptics” 
Khabibullo Ismailovich Abdusamatov*, Syun-Ichi Akasofu*, Sallie Baliunas, Tim Ball, Robert 
Balling*, Fred Barnes, Joe Barton, Joe Bastardi, David Bellamy, Tom  Bethell, Robert Bidinotto, 
Roy Blunt, Sonja Boehmer, Andrew Bolt, John Brignell*, Nigel Calder, Ian Castles*, George 
Chilingarian, John Christy*, Ian Clark, Philip Cooney, Robert Davis, David Deming*, David 
Douglass, Lester Hogan, Craig Idso, Keith Idso, Sherwood Idso, Zbigniew Jaworowski, Wibjorn 
Karlen, William Kininmonth, Nigel Lawson, Douglas Leahey, David Legates, Richard Lindzen*, 
Ross Mckitrick*, Patrick Michaels, Lubos Motl*, Kary  Mullis, Tad Murty, Tim Patterson, Benny 
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Peiser*, Ian Plimer, Arthur Robinson, Frederick Seitz, Nir Shaviv, Fred Smith, Willie Soon, 
Thomas Sowell, Roy Spencer, Philip Stott, Hendrik Tennekes, Jan Veizer, Peter Walsh, Edward 
Wegman 
 
Other sources 
Daniel Abbasi, Augie Auer, Jonathan Boston, Daniel Botkin*, Reid Bryson, Robert Carter*, 
Ralph Chapman, Al Gore, Kirtland C. Griffin*, David Henderson, Christopher Landsea*, Bjorn 
Lomborg, Tim Osborn, Roger Pielke*, Henrik Saxe, Thomas Schelling*, Matthew Sobel, 
Nicholas Stern*, Brian Valentine*, Antonio Zichichi. 
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